"single" would be without baseball. We rolled our eyes at that one, reveling in the maestro's penchant for the occult. As usual, though, Professor Hart was trying to tell us groundlings something precious. He was warning us that conventional legal thinking, by stressing rigorous deconstructive analysis, can obscure an important unity in favor of components that should be analyzed, not solely as free standing phenomena, but as part of the unity. Without recognition of the unity, analysis of the components risks being carried on in a normative vacuum that will inevitably be filled by another tie breaking mechanism, often to the detriment of the larger enter prise. A ban on littering in the park, for example, taken in isola tion, might justify stringent prophylactic measures, like a ban on picnicking, or leafleting, or bringing newspapers into the park. Only when the littering ban is subsumed into the larger unity of a law of recreation (or something else) can its scope be properly ana lyzed.1 Thirty-five years late, I assume that was what Professor Hart meant when he warned us against thinking about "singles" without thinking about baseball.
Nowhere is Professor Hart's warning about the potential pitfalls of excessively deconstructive legal analysis more important than in thinking about the law of democracy. Conventional legal analysis has ruthlessly deconstructed democracy into component parts, and analyzed the components with only cursory attention to the larger democratic enterprise. A functioning democracy is, after all, the sum of crucial components -free speech, political equality, liberty, toleration, empathy, self-interest, efficiency, and much more. In the fifty-odd years that American courts have struggled seriously with the care and feeding of the democratic process,2 however, legal doc trine has paid little attention to democracy as a unifying normative ideal. Instead, the functional reality of democracy in the United States is, and has been, held hostage to the law governing its com ponents. Fi rst Amendment analysis dictates the ground rules gov erning campaign :financing without any real attention to what kind of democracy comes out the other end.3 Equal protection analysis dominates voting rights law,4 and dictates what kind of representa tional patterns we can have,5 without much, if any, thought about what the effect will be on democracy. In truth, American courts often appear to govern our democracy much like a well-meaning umpire who thinks that rules governing "singles" can be crafted without thinking much about baseball.
Until we begin to think about the law of democracy as an inter related set of legal principles designed to serve a normative ideal, the quality of American democracy will remain hostage to the law governing its components. That is why publication of Th e Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Po litical Process, the first casebook to treat the legal rules governing the democratic process as a unified field of study, is such a welcome event.6 One of the most important functions of an excellent casebook is to identify and reinforce a unity, helping us to approach its components not simply as freestanding doctrinal events, but as integral parts oLa greater whole. While Th e Law of Democracy is only the beginnin g of the process, by persuasively conceiving of the law of democracy as an academic unity worthy of classroom attention, the authors Samuel 2. Somewhat arbitrarily, I date the beginnin g of modem judicial involvement in the law of democracy as occurring during the late 1940s with the decision in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946) , followed by the White Primary cases, including Te rry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953) . Of course, earlier intersections exist. See, e.g., Lane v. Wi lson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ; United States v. Guinn, 238 U. S. 347 (1915) ; Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) . The earlier cases dealt less with contestable ground rules gov erning democracy than with the indefensible exclusion of black Americans from the nation's political life, an act of bigotry having little or nothing to do with serious thinking about democracy.
3. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) . It is probably impossible to overstate the damage to American democracy caused by Buckley 's insistence on linking free speech and money.
4. Carrington v. Rash pioneered the use of equal protection analysis to protect voting rights. See generally 380 U. S. 89 (1965) . It turns out that using equality to define voting rights promotes formalism and inhibits thinking about the qualitative aspect of the right to vote.
5. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962) . Equality-driven representational patterns are vulnerable to manipulation in ways that adversely affect voting quality, while respecting for mal equality. See also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) .
6. An earlier casebook, DANIEL H A YS LoWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1995), provided an extremely helpful summ ary of aspects of the electoral pro cess, but did not attempt to link the material in a conceptual whole. [Vol. 97:1578 Issacharoff,7 Pamela Karlan,8 and Rick Pildes9 have performed an invaluable service.
Without denigrating the book's generally excellent content, its most important achievement may well be its very existence. By providing academics with a set of challenging and useful teaching materials in the area of democracy, the book helps to establish the law of democracy as an independent field of study. One can expect challenges to the vision (or the lack of vision) projected by this book, but I do not believe that it will be possible to ignore the need for a democracy-centered critique of the various strands of doctrine that coalesce to form the legal matrix for our politics. Moreover, once the teaching of the law of democracy proliferates in our law schools, it is only a matter of time until considerably more serious legal academic discussion of the normative questions surrounding democracy emerges.10 Now that the important questions that swirl about the law of democracy in a rich mixture of normative debate and descriptive assessment have an academic focus in a discrete field of legal study, we can finally begin thinking about littering, for example, not as a freestanding idea, but in the context of an over arching law of recreation. 10. Among those questions are: Why is democracy preferable to other forms of govern ment? What is it that we hope to achieve by turning to democracy instead of to some other form of government? What version of democracy best advances the values that incline us towards democracy in the first place? How should we define the electorate? Is voting a right, a duty, or a privilege? Should the onus of registration be borne by the individual? Is voter registration in advance of an election still necessary? What would happen if we moved to same-day registration? Why isn't election day a holiday? Why not vote on the weekend? Why not vote on the Internet? What does it mean to cast a meaningful vote? Do perennial losers in politically gerrymandered districts have a real vote? How do we decide which inter ests are entitled to representation? What is the role of a protest vote? Should (must) the ballot be enriched to include "none of the above"? Who should be able to run for offi ce? What is the role of major political parties? What roles do minor parties play? How should we staff the electoral process? Is it healthy to allow the two major parties to administer our electoral processes? How should we finance democracy? Should restrictions be placed on extremely wealthy participants in the name of equality? In the name of preventing corrup tion? Should we subsidize aspects of the campaign? What do we mean by fair representa tion? What is the responsibility of a representative? Should we have term limits? What is the role of groups in establishing representation? Is race different from other group charac teristics? When, if ever, should we move from single-member districts to forms of at-large representation? Should we be experimenting with aspects of proportional representation? What role do groups play in the democratic process? What is the role of direct democracy? How can we improve the quality of democratic discourse? And, what is the relative role of courts, legislatures, and the people in answering these questions?
II.
Despite its occasionally arbitrary organization, Th e Law of Democracy teaches quite well. I attempted a course in the law of democracy before the book's publication. The absence of a care fully selected set of edited cases forced students and the instructor to reinvent the wheel each semester. As anyone who attempts to teach in a new field can attest, the burden of putting together teach ing materials is extremely daunting. My efforts to assign volumi nous, unedited case readings were only partially successful. As a practical matter, therefore, the book's publication makes a demand ing course on the law of democracy generally available for the first time.
Th e Law of Democracy opens with a short but challenging Chapter entitled "Introduction to the Selection of Democratic Insti tutions" built around an apportionment case -Lucas v. Fo rty Fo urth General Assembly of Colorado.11 In Lucas, Colorado voters approved an apportionment scheme that favored rural districts in allocating seats in the State Senate. The apportionment plan, which significantly deviated from the one-person, one-vote standard, was adopted by a maj ority of the voters in every Colorado county, in cluding the urban counties receiving disproportionately low repre sentation. The authors present students with excerpts from Chief Ju stice Warren's now-conventional defense of the one-person, one vote principle, and two dissents by Justices Clark and Stewart, rais ing institutional and philosophical challenges to a single approach to apportioning both houses of the legislatures of the fifty states. The authors use the opinions skillful l y to raise troubling questions about the role of courts in setting the ground rules for democracy. Characteristically, the chapter is more successful in raising doubts about the institutional competence of courts than it is in introducing students to normative arguments in favor or against certain concep tions of democracy. Indeed, if Th e Law of Democracy has a serious flaw, it is a seeming reluctance to go beyond judicial opinions to explore the fundamental normative questions of democracy that underlie the cases. But more about that later.
I also have a minor quibble with confining the Introduction to Lucas, which seems to me a bloodless case that does not reflect the passion that often surfaces in democracy litigation. I find it helpful to pair Lucas with a second case12 involving another judicial effort to define basic democratic ground-rules.
11. 377 U.S. 713 (1964) ception of democracy similar to the nontextual concepts of "Our Federalism" and "the doctrine of separation of powers" that awaits judicial development? \Vtll evolving notions of customary international law ever provide judicial protection for democratic values?
18. The Supreme Court appears to have adopted an extremely narrow conception of vot ing, limiting it to a formal, instrumental opportunity to choose the winner in an election, and rejecting any effort to infuse it with qualitative, expressive or associational values. See Burdick v. Ta kushi, 504 U.S. 428 {1992) (finding no constitutional right to cast write-in bal lot); T= ons v. Tw in Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 {1997) (upholding ban on the ability of minor party to endorse major party candidate because minor party adherents are free to vote for preferred candidate on a major party line).
19. Although cases denying the right to vote to women and convicted felons raise the issue provocatively, there is no systematic exploration of competing theories of suffrage. Should less-educated voters be encouraged to vote? Should voting be a duty? 20. Throughout the book, the authors struggle with a genuine dilemma: Whether to stress general democratic theory or the struggle for black enfranchisement? The history of the systematic disenfranchisement of African Americans is the most egregious failure in our democratic past. Its importance in any casebook about democracy is obvious. Moreover, many of our most difficult contemporary democracy law issues are shaped by the desire to overcome that history of racial exclusion. Tr eating the narrative of African-American exclu sion as a separate topic, however, interferes with a coherent theoretical presentation. In my opinion, Chapter 2 on the Right to Participate is weakened by failing to integrate the story of African-American disenfranchisement into the general question of how the electorate is to be defined.
participation. Less than half the eligible electorate voted in the last Presidential election.21 The turnout for the most recent Congres sional elections was thirty-six percent.22 Often, state and local turn outs are even lower. Wo rse, turnouts are skewed by race and economic status, so that the voting electorate is much richer and whiter than the nation.23 Many believe that extremely low levels of voter turnout, especially among the poor, threaten the moral integ rity of the democratic process. While it is refreshing to see the issue raised at all, the leading casebook on the law of democracy should spend more time and intellectual energy considering why poor peo ple do not vote, and whether anything can, or should, be done about it.
Chapter Three, entitled "The Reapportionment Revolution" is a thorough treatment of the rise of the one-person, one-vote princi ple, taking students from Colegrove v. Green24 through Baker v. Carr25 and Reynolds v. Sims. 26 The authors perceptively note that the one-person, one-vote principle protects formal voting equality, but is vulnerable to gerrymanders and other techniques that main tain formal equality but erode voting power. The chapter includes thoughtful material on apportioning local government and closes with an excellent discussion of the United States Senate as an example of a defensible apportionment that radically departs from one-person, one-vote standards.27 I have three quibbles with the Reapportionment Chapter. The first is an organizational disagreement about the best place to dis cuss so-called "limited purpose" elections that permit only a small slice of the population to vote.28 The authors treat limited purpose elections as a problem in local apportionment. I find it more useful to introduce the issue as a problem in defining the electorate, which would be better dealt with in a more ambitious chapter on the the-21. See Barbara Vo bejda, Just Un der Half Of Possible Vo ters Went to the Polls, WASH. PosT, Nov. 7, 1996, at it difficult to assess the one person, one-vote principle in a normative vacuum. Finally, the chapter ends just when it is becoming interesting. Once the formal istic limits of one-person, one-vote have been so convincingly demonstrated, it makes far better pedagogic (and analytic) sense to move immediately to techniques that comply with formal voting equality, but erode real-world voting power, like vote dilution, vote fragmentation, racial gerrymandering, and political gerrymander ing. That material is presented extremely well almost 200 pages later in Chapter Six ("Majority Rule and Minority Vote Dilution"), Chapter Seven ("Racial Vote Dilution Under the Voting Rights Act"), and Chapter Eight ("Redistricting and Representation"), three of the strongest chapters in the book.30
The long hiatus between the one-person, one-vote cases in Chapter Three, and the vote dilution/gerrymandering issues in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, is due primarily to a 100-page exe gesis on the preclearance provisions of Section Five of the Vo ting Rights Act, requiring so-called "covered jurisdictions" to obtain clearance from the Justice Department before altering their elec tion laws.31 The exhaustive approach to the preclearance chapter is repeated in the section in Chapter Tw o dealing with black disen franchisement, and Chapter Seven on the workings of Section 1\v o of the Voting Rights Act. While the treatment of the material is uniformly excellent, as I have suggested, an organizational tension exists between the authors' understandable desire to chronicle the struggle for black enfranchisement and the more general problems of democratic theory posed elsewhere in the book. Preclearance is 29. Excerpts from Hanna Pitkin's classic text on the meanings of representation would be an obvious candidate for inclusion. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRE· SENTATION (1967) .
30. The tension between theoretical coherence and broad narrative coverage of black disenfranchisement is illustrated in Chapter 7, which explores the intricacies of Section 2 racial vote dilution at substantial length. It might be possible to combine the three chapters into a more focused discussion of the intrinsic problems that one-person, one-vote alone cannot resolve.
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994) . Preclearance zeros in on areas likely to have engaged in improper efforts to disenfranchise minorities, and requires them to obtain Justice Depart ment approval to assure that changes in election laws do not adversely affect minority voters. Preclearance is triggered by a sub-50% voter turnout as of a particular election, coupled with the existence of a "test or device," like a literacy test, capable of being used unfairly to disenfranchise minorities. Ironically, the entire nation met the sub-50% test in the 1996 Pres idential election. The states of the old Confederacy, three counties in New York City, several counties in California, as well as Alaska and several counties in the Southwest currently fall under preclearance. a remarkable success story that altered the political climate of the old Confederacy and made black political participation a reality.
Moreover, the preclearance material is a tour de fo rce, demonstrat ing an encyclopedic grasp of theory and practice. It is, however, essentially a digression from the overriding issues of democratic theory posed by the casebook. As an important piece of history, and as an example of an ingenious remedial tool, material on preclearance has an important place in any casebook on democracy. But it does not deserve pride of place.
Inserted between the one-person, one-vote material in Chapter Three and the vote dilution/gerrymandering coverage in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, is a curious and only partially successful Chapter on access to the ballot, entitled the "Role of Political Parties." The authors apparently view political parties as intrinsic guardians and gatekeepers of the ballot. Thus, the chapter attempts to do two things at once. It rigorously explores the limits of auton omy enjoyed by political parties and investigates the limits placed on access to the ballot.
There is an important insight in linking political parties to ballot access, because the two major parties often act as a cartel to pre vent competition from third parties. Timmons v. Tw in Cities Area New Pa rty32 is only the most rec�nt example. The effort to conflate political parties and ballot access, however, obscures as much as it reveals. Deciding who should be allowed to run for office and what kinds of ballot choices should be available to the electorate is not necessarily the same thing as deciding how much autonomy polit ical parties should enjoy. And it certainly is not a decision that should be left to political parties. A more conventional approach that explores the ballot access cases beginnin g with Williams v. Rhodes, 33 and critiques the ballot choice issues raised by Burdick v. Ta kushi34 and Timmons from the perspective of what it means to cast a meaningful vote, should be an important stand-alone chapter. This presentation should be followed by an exploration of the role major and minor political parties play in the democratic process and a critique of the legal matrix in which parties operate. Until some attention is given to the normative role of political parties, both major and minor, I find it hard to evaluate existing law.
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight explore the many ways that ideal representation patterns can be compromised. Chapter Eight, con centrating on partisan and racial gerrymanders, is particularly well structured and provides an excellent framework for discussion of the inherent limitations of any system of geographically defined 32. 520 U. S. 351 (1997 representation. Once again, though, just as the chapter gets really interesting, it ends. The thread is not picked up until Chapter Eleven, a unique and provocative discussion of potential alterna tives to our pattern of single-member, first-past-the-post, majority districting, including cumulative voting, preference voting, limited voting, at-large districting, and proportional representation.
Chapter Nine is a bare-bones treatment of money and politics that provides a basic introduction to issues posed by efforts to regu late campaign financing, but that falls substantially short of the comprehensive coverage given to other areas of democracy law. limits. H this was a chapter in a Constitutional Law casebook, the coverage would be adequate, especially since the authors' notes consistently pose thoughtful questions; but in a casebook devoted to the law of democracy, the coverage of money and politics is dis tinctly thin.
In part, my dissatisfaction with the scope of the chapter on money and politics reflects a personal concern that disparity of wealth is among the most important issues facing American democracy. That massive inequalities tied to wealth exist in our political system is be yond dispute. The most obvious tilt towards wealth is our constitu tional commitment to a laissez-faire campaign financing system that maximizes the political power of extremely wealthy individuals and corporations.38 Under our existing campaign financing system, Amer ican political campaigns are predominantly funded by the top of the economic tree, with dramatic consequences for skewing the political agenda, selecting the candidates, affe cting the outcome of elections, changing the course of legislative debate, and altering patterns of ac cess to public officials . Despite heroic efforts to control the size and source of campaign contributions, massive loopholes have evolved that permit corporations and extremely wealthy individuals to pour unlimited sums into the electoral process.39 Incumbents regularly out- 39. The two most egregious loopholes: (1) allowing unlimited "soft-money" contribu tions from any source, including corporations and labor unions, to political parties, as long as the money is not used directly in a federal candidate's campaign; and (2) allowing unlimited raise and outspend challengers by as much as sixty-to-one. Indeed, fully twenty-five percent of House seats, and an even greater number of state legislative seats, are uncontested in part because no challenger can raise enough money to wage a credible campaign.40 Access to the mass media is beyond the financial means of most candidates chal lenging the reigning party duopoly41 and beyond the means of many major party challengers seeking to unseat an entrenched figure.42 Moreover, an equally potent, if less obvious, wealth advantage flows from U.S. laws governing registration and voting that, alone among the world's developed democracies, place the inertial obliga tion on the prospective voter to register in advance of the election, and force working people to vote on a workday.43 Burdening voting with significant transaction costs does more than diminish voter par ticipation; it skews the voting electorate towards wealthy and edu cated voters who are more likely to overcome multiple transaction costs in order to vote.44 Not surprisingly, our actual pattern of voter participation reflects the predicted shift toward low voter tumouts,45
(and undisclosed) spending on so-called "issue ads" that do everything but use the "magic words" "vote for" or "vote against" in an obvious effort to cause the election or defeat of a particular candidate. The resulting practice de jour is to make huge soft money contributions from corporate treasuries to political parties for use in funding issue ads to run in connection with specific elections. The Republican Party has gone so far as to argue that the soft money issue ads can be coordinated with the candidate and still remain beyond the scope of the FEC. See Republican Natl. Comm. v. Federal Election Commn., No. 98-5263, 1998 WL 794896 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1998).
40. Gerrymandering to favor incumbents does not hurt either. In the most recent elec tion, The State of New York managed to achieve a 100% incumbency reelection rate in both houses of the legislature. It must be because New Yo rkers are so pleased with the career politicians who govern us.
41. That we have a formal duopoly is indicated by Timmons v. Tw in Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding ban on multiple-party or fusion candidacies for elected office); see also Burdick v. Ta kushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding ban on write-in voting).
42. Ballot access rules in connection with primary challenges can be so restrictive that only an enormously wealthy challenger can achieve ballot status. See Rockefeller v. Powers, 78 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. den ied, 517 U. S. 1203 (1996) [Vol. 97:1578 with disproportionately high participation by wealthy, well-educated voters, and disproportionately low participation by the poor and less well educated.46 Why is our political system so rigged in favor of wealth? The story we usually tell ourselves is that wealth-driven political inequality is a necessary consequence of our liberal constitutional system. We can't cut back on the ability of the wealthy to dominate electoral politics because it would be a violation of our Fi rst Amendment commitment to political autonomy. 47 46. See supra note 24. A third tilt toward the wealthy in our system is the use of a win ner-take-all, single member districting that often submerges the political interests of the poor within a larger, more middle-class constituency. The relationship between apportionment and the fair representation of the poor is beyond the scope of this paper, though very much within its spirit.
Fm ally, restrictive ballot access laws and substantial candidate filing fees can have the effect of limiting candidates to economically comfortable contestants. Even if an under financed group achieves ballot status, it often has been forced to spend its campaign treasury on satisfying restrictive ballot access rules. compulsory cooperation with the census.52 We even tell ourselves that we cannot eliminate the double transaction costs for registration and voting because it would risk electoral fraud and insert the government too directly into the political process, even though six states have either abolished voter registration or moved to same-day registration on Election Day.53 The net result is a democratic process that is for mally equal in theory, but dramatically unequal in practice. One hopes that future editions of Th e Law of Democracy will focus more intensely on the role of wealth in American democracy. (Vol. 97:1578 the courts should seek to defend. I fear that any attempt to forge a law of democracy without a normative conception of what democ racy should be cannot yield coherent results.
Th e Law of Democracy
In his decision for the Court in Colegrove, and his dissent in Baker, 56 Ju stice Felix Frankfurter warned that American judges have no business intervening in politics, even to correct massive malapportionment. He warned that, lacking an explicit textual mandate, federal judges seeking to defend democratic values would necessarily function as amateur political scientists imposing per sonal views about the best way to organize a democracy. The out come of such a subjective and undisciplined process, he warned, would be both flawed democracy and erosion of respect for the judiciary.
Justice Fr ankfurter was profoundly wrong in arguing that fed eral judges have almost no role in preserving a fair democratic pro cess. Reinforcing democracy is among the judiciary's most important tasks. Self-interested political maj orities can hardly be trusted to set fair democratic ground rules that risk sweeping them from power.57 Our sorry history of selective disenfranchisement of vulnerable minorities, ballot manipulation, electoral bribery, gerry mandering, and campaign dishonesty makes clear that unreview able maj oritarian control of the machinery of democracy invites erosion of underlying democratic values. In the end, Ju stice Frankfurter's warning to judges to avoid the "political thicket" sim ply licenses entrenched maj orities to manipulate the rules of the game to keep themselves in power.58
Ju stice Fr ankfurter was all too right, however, in predicting that judges would fail to develop a coherent approach to protecting democracy. In the thirty-seven years since Baker, American judges, accepting Justice Fr ankfurter's inj unction that the Constitution's ·text does not authorize judicial development of a normative vision of democracy, have failed to posit a coherent model of the democ racy they seek to protect. Lacking normative coherence, the "democracy" cases betray precisely the rootless activism predicted by Ju stice Frankfurter. Sadly, the judiciary has been overly timid when protecting democracy called for boldness; and hyperactive when the democratic process desperately needed a little judicial re straint. For example, judges have protected a narrowly defined, strictly formal right to vote,59 but have balked at developing a ro bust, affirmative right to vote that would confront the fact that the law currently skews American electoral participation radically to ward the wealthy and well-educated, and denies voters a chance to use the ballot expressively. Judges have announced a watered down version of a right to run for office;60 but have allowed the so called right to be encumbered with so many restrictions that, in many jurisdictions, it is prohibitively difficult for anyone except a major party candidate to qualify for the ballot. Judges have im posed ground rules for campaign financing61 that distinguish be tween campaign contributions and campaign expenditures, erecting a disastrous system that no rational legislature would have enacted. Judges have enforced a purely formal right to equal representa tion,62 but have refused to measure substantive representational fairness.63 Judges have both protected and attacked political par ties,64 but have not attempted to develop a theory of the roles of major and third parties in a vibrant democracy. Judges have cele brated the importance of political discussion, but have done little or nothing to assist in improving the quality of political discourse. 65
The pragmatic consequences of the democracy cases have also been very disappointing. Despite judicial efforts to protect the for mal right to vote, voting participation is at an all-time low, varies dramatically by class and race, and is declining. Despite the enunci ation of a formal right to run for office, the Court has acquiesced in legally enforced duopoly control of American politics by the two major parties, and has upheld restrictions that render it prohibi tively expensive for third parties and independents to reach the ballot. Despite recognition that corrupt campaign contributions and massive wealth disparity pose a threat to the democratic pro cess, the Court has placed campaign finance reform in a straight- [Vol. 97:1578 jacket that condemns us to a political process that looks more like an auction than an election. Despite formal adherence to a princi ple of representative fairness under the rubric "one-person, one vote," the Court has permitted massive reciprocal political gerry mandering that leaves much of the nation in noncompetitive elec tion districts;66 has allowed incumbents to stack the deck in favor of re-election; and has forbidden efforts to enhance the representative power of racial minorities. Despite repeated recognition of the cen tral role of political discussion in our democracy, the Court has de clined to play a role in improving the quality of electoral discourse.
Is this the best that law can do? I think not.
IV.
If the judiciary is to carry out the critical function of protecting democracy, it must be prepared to develop and defend the coherent normative model of democracy latent in the constitutional text. Otherwise, judicial protection of democracy will continue to resem ble Ju stice Fr ankfurter's derisive description of ad hoc amateur political science. Contrary to Ju stice Frankfurter's assertion, I be lieve that the constitutional text reveals a normative vision of democracy that is amenable to coherent judicial articulation and enforcement.
Although it is not completely silent about the mechanics of de mocracy, a conventional reading of the body of the Constitution does not yield a normative theory of democracy.67 The constitu-66. See CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, MONOPOLY POLITICS (1997) (demon strating that many elections are so uncompetitive that they are, for all intents and purposes, uncontested).
67. Article IV, Section 4 guarantees a republican form of government to the states. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 requires periodic election of members of the House of Repre sentatives and keys voting for the House of Representatives to the electorate for the most numerous house of the relevant state legislature. Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 establishes age, citizenship, and residence requirements for election to the House. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 incorporates the infamous three-fifths compromise that counts each slave as three fifths of a person for apportionment purposes; provides for decennial enumeration; and im poses a numerical minimum on the size of a House district. Article 1, Section 2, Clause 4 authorizes state governors to provide for interim elections to fill House vacancies. Article 1, Section 3, Clause 1 provides for two Senators from each state to be selected by the state legislatures. Article 1, Section 3, Clause 3 establishes age, citizenship, and residence require ments for election to the Senate. Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1 reserves to Congress the final power to regulate the "Tiffie, Place and Manner" of Congressional elections, except for the place of electing Senators. Article 1, Section 4, Clause 2 requires that Congress assemble at least once each year. Article 1, Section 5, Clause 1 vests Congress with power to judge the "elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members." Article 1, Section 5, Clause 2 empowers each House of Congress to expel members on a two-thirds vote. Article 1, Section 5, Clause 3 provides for publicly recorded votes and a public record of debates. Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1 provides for protection against arrest during the legislative session and establishes the speech or debate privilege shielding legislators from liability for performing legislative functions. Article 1, Section 6, Clause 2 prohibits members of Congress from hold ing other federal public office or from being appointed to a federal job created, or enhanced tional text, however, contains not a word about the substantive right to vote or to run for office, nor about what constitutes fair representation. Indeed, the only explicit affirmative protection of democratic participation in the body of the Constitution is the pro hibition in Article VI on the use of a "religious test" as a "qualifica tion to any office or public trust under the United States."68
The virtual silence in the body of the Federal Constitution about the substantive aspects of democracy is not surprising. The idea of a national Bill of Rights had not yet been broached. The initial assumption of the Fo unders was that each state would develop its own model of democracy, with the federal institutions elected in accordance with the respective state visions. The only checks on the states were the republican guarantee clause, the religious test clause, and the negative pregnant contained in the qualifications clause.
Indeed, given the relatively undeveloped state of democratic political theory in 1787, it would have been miraculous to find a well-developed normative theory of democracy in the body of the Constitution. Conceptions of suffrage were extremely limited. Ideas of representation were in their infancy. Political parties were virtually unknown. Openly running for office was a new, and not altogether respectable, idea.
It fell to the Article VI amendment process to flesh out a nor mative conception of democracy, beginnin g with the adoption of the Fi rst Amendment. The six textual ideas in Madison's Fi rst Amendment -no establishment of religion; free exercise of reli gion; free speech; free press; free assembly; and the right to petition government for redress of grievances -are a meticulously drawn road map for a functioning democracy. The First Amendment is organized as a series of concentric circles proceeding in orderly steps from protection of the interior recesses of religious conscience to formal political interaction with government. It opens with Establishment Clause protection of conscience, moves to Free Ex ercise Clause protection of public displays of conscience, continues with Free Speech Protection Clause of expression of ideas by indi viduals, extends to institutional expression of ideas through a free press, then moves to protecting collective action through free as- 68. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 3. [Vo l. 97:1578 sembly , 6 9 and culminates in protecting formal interaction with the government through petitions for redress of grievances. The rigor ous inside-out organization of the six ideas is no coincidence. It is a democratic roadmap. Madison placed each essential element of the democratic enterprise in its natural chronological setting. The Fi rst Amendment mirrors the life cycle of a democratic idea, moving from the interior recesses of individual conscience, to discussion and collective action, and culminating in the formal give and take of politics. Madison's vision of the vibrant democracy latent in the unique organization of the Fi rst Amendment70 remains one of our most valuable guides to the kind of democracy envisioned by the Constitution.
Of the seventeen amendments adopted after the Bill of Rights, eleven deal explicitly with the democratic process.71 The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment continued the development of a normative conception of democracy in the Constitutional text.72 By explicitly introducing the idea of equality before the law into the Constitution for the first time, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause reinforced the picture of egalitarian democracy painted by the Fi rst Amendment and imposed it directly on the states. Moreover, the often overlooked Section Tw o of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly linked voting and fair represen tation for the first time. Fi nally, by providing the bridge by which the Bill of Rights was transmitted to the states, the Fo urteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause made possible a national ideal of democracy, supplanting the original invitation to each state to develop a separate conception of democracy with a national mini mum. Read in conjunction with Madison's Fi rst Amendment, the Fourteenth presents the outline of a powerful normative vision of an egalitarian democracy.
The Fi fteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Tw enty-Third , 1\venty Fo urth, and Tw enty-Sixth Amendments establish and implement the principle of universal suffrage by banning voting discrimination on the basis of race, gender, wealth, or age; and by providing for the direct popular election of Senators, and the participation of the res idents of the District of Columbia in the election of the President. 70. No other rights-bearing provision in our constitutional experience, or in the constitu tional experience of our sister democracies, bears a similar organizational pattern .
71. Of the six post-Bill of Rights amendments that do not deal with democracy, two, the 18th and 21st, deal with Prohibition; one, the 13th, abolishes slavery; one, the 11th, limits federal jurisdiction over states; one, the 16th, authorizes the income tax; and one, the 27th, limits Congress's power to raise its own pay.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The Tw elfth, Tw entieth, Tw enty-Second, and Tw enty-Fifth Amend ments "democratize" the Presidency by providing for the separate election of the President and Vice-President, limiting the term of a lame duck President, imposing a two-term limit on the Presidency, and assuring orderly succession in time of Presidential disability.
Thus, whatever the failings of the body of the 1787 Constitution, the complete modem text, as amended, is suffused with a normative vision of democracy that views every American as a member of a self-governing community of political equals and that guarantees all members of the polity the equal right to participate effectively in the processes of self-governance.
In New Yo rk Times v. Sullivan, 73 the Supreme Court committed to a normative model of the Fi rst Amendment. For thirty-five years the Court has rigorously, some might say ruthlessly, enforced that model. The Court has never made a similar commitment to a nor mative model of democracy. Until that commitment takes place I fear that the law of democracy will continue to look like Hamlet without the ghost. The Law of Democracy displays extraordinary talent and commitment in revealing, clarifying, and critiquing what our law of democracy currently is. I look forward to future editions that grapple as vigorously with what our democracy should be.
73. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) .
